Abstract: Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege's puzzle.
the natural order, it does not plausibly stem from-and Margolis and Laurence do not view it as stemming from-a blanket nominalism that rejects the existence of any abstract objects whatsoever.
In fact, the commitment to abstract objects is closer to home than reductivists typically acknowledge. First, since reductivists usually individuate token Mentalese symbols by the formal types to which they belong, they are apparently committed to types. While a nominalist reductivist might try to identify such types with sets of their actual tokens, this response faces a serious obstacle. How are reductivists to explain the fact that there are concepts humans will never acquire-for example, because of their cognitive limitations, or because human life will come to an end before humans have realized their full cognitive potential (Peacocke 2005, 169) ? The obvious suggestion, endorsed by Margolis and Laurence (2007, 568) , is to appeal to uninstantiated Mentalese symbol types. Margolis and Laurence thus embrace a form of Platonism, claiming that there is "no more reason to think that every mental representation type must be instantiated than there is to suppose that every property must be instantiated" (2007, 589, n. 12) . 1 Second, although reductivists deny that Mentalese symbols have senses as their contents, they do not deny that Mentalese symbols have contents. They just construe these contents in a Russellian manner, taking them to consist of objects, properties, and relations. Thus, the Mentalese symbol RED refers to the property red. Notice, however, that properties are often conceived as abstract objects. While a nominalist reductivist might try to dispense with such abstract entities by identifying properties with their instances, reductivists such as Fodor (1990) invoke uninstantiated properties to capture the contents of our thoughts about non--existents such as phlogiston and tooth fairies. 2 What, then, is the ontological problem with senses? According to Fodor, "A more plausible scruple-one I am inclined to take seriously-objects to unreduced epistemic relations like grasping propositions" (1990, 13) . Margolis and Laurence elaborate that the ontological problem with senses stems not from nominalism, but from "the fact that senses are mind--independent entities that are supposed to stand apart from us, like numbers or Platonic forms" (2007, 580) . In their view, this mind--independence gives rise to the problem of how people can stand in an appropriate relation to senses in order for those senses to be explanatorily relevant to their behavior. As Fregeans understand it, a person who believes that Albert is friendly has to grasp the senses Albert and is friendly. But this grasping relation can appear mystifying. As Margolis and Laurence write, Clearly, grasping is a metaphor for a cognitive relation that needs to be explicated. The problem is that it is hard to see how this can be done in a way that is consistent with the view that senses are abstract objects. Notice that the relation can't be causal, since senses, as abstract particulars, are 1 A nominalist reductivist might part ways with Margolis and Laurence here by appealing to possible but non--actual tokens. This would commit her to modal properties, but arguably not types. My point, however, is not that there is no way for a nominalist about Mentalese symbols to coherently maintain her nominalism, but that nominalism is not motivating the ontological worries of reductivists such as Margolis and Laurence. 2 Again, a die--hard nominalist might appeal to possible yet non--actual property--instances. But my point, again, is simply that nominalism is not motivating the ontological worries of Fodor or Margolis and Laurence. supposed to fall outside the realm of physical causes and effects. But if it's not causal, the nature of the relation remains utterly mysterious. (2007, 580) I think that Margolis and Laurence are motivated by something like the following picture. They allow that there can be these abstract objects, senses, which exist off in Plato's heaven. But they don't see how a person, who is located in the causal order of space and time, could be related to those objects. How could Joe, who's seated over here at the bar stool, be related to Plato's heaven?
It is worth considering why the same problem does not arise for the abstract objects reductivists invoke-Mentalese symbol types and properties. For Mentalese symbol types, the answer is straightforward. A thinker is cognitively related to a Mentalese symbol type by virtue of tokening that type. Just as the English word "red" can be tokened on the page, the Mentalese expression RED can be tokened in the brain. In each case the token will be located in space and time, though whereas a token of the word "red" might consist of an arrangement of ink markings, a token of the Mentalese symbol RED might consist of a pattern of neural firings. While the question of how Mentalese symbols are related to their referents is more controversial, reductivists typically appeal to some type of lawful causal relation. Roughly: the Mentalese symbol DOG represents the property dog if dogs reliably cause the symbol DOG to be tokened. 3 For reductivists, the symbol--referent relation is thus no more mysterious than the relation that exists between any two causally related entities.
If the relation between a thinker and a sense were at bottom a causal relation as reductivists take the relation between a Mentalese symbol and its referent to be, there would be no ontological worry about how thinkers could be related to them. Nor would there be any concern if senses were like Mentalese symbols in admitting of a type--token relation. The worry exercising "grasping" relation that thinkers are alleged to stand in towards senses thus remains "utterly mysterious".
Following Fodor (1998, 17--21) , Margolis and Laurence isolate a consequence of the failure to explicate the grasping relation. They argue that Fregeans haven't explained how senses can solve "the mode of presentation problem"-i.e., Frege's puzzle of how thinkers can represent the same referent in different ways. They put this worry as follows.
Senses, like most referents, are external to our minds, and because of this it's hard to see why we shouldn't be able to stand in different cognitive/epistemic relations towards them as well (Fodor 1998 
Varieties of Mind--Independence
As we have seen, Margolis and Laurence worry that the mind--independence of senses makes it difficult to explain the grasping relation, and (as a corollary) why senses can be grasped in only one way. In this section, I want to get clearer about the nature of this worry by teasing apart several different notions of mind--independence, and considering which, if any, are uniquely problematic for senses. The result will be a better understanding of the worry that is motivating Margolis and
Laurence-and of the steps Fregeans might take to address it.
Epistemic Mind--Independence
Let us say that X is epistemically mind--independent just in case it is possible for more than one mind to be epistemically related to X. Thus, the weather, the laws of physics, and mathematical theorems are all epistemically mind--independent since more than one person can know about them.
Conversely, many philosophers hold that sensations are not epistemically mind--independent since each person's sensations are private. You may assume that the sensation I experience when I call something "red" is the same as the sensation you experience, but you cannot know that the two sensations are the same since you really only know what your own sensations are like. Frege clearly maintains that most senses are epistemically mind--independent, taking care to contrast them with ideas (roughly: mental images), which he views as accessible by only one mind (e.g., 1892, 154-55; 1918, 334-37 
Causal Mind--Independence
Another type of mind--independence is causal, where X is causally mind--independent just in case X cannot enter into causal relations with anything mental. Because senses are abstract objects, and thus not located in the causal framework of space or time, it is uncontroversial that they are causally mind--independent. Notice, however, that this fails to distinguish senses from Mentalese symbol types, which are likewise abstract and causally impotent. The causal mind--independence of senses thus cannot be what makes them uniquely problematic either.
Analytic Mind--Independence
A much stronger type of mind--independence is analytic, where X is analytically mind--independent just in case our best analysis of X-i.e., our best characterization of X's nature-does not appeal to anything mental. Putting idealism to one side, purely physical entities such as rocks, trees, and gravity are thus analytically mind--independent. Putting psychologism to one side, mathematical entities such as numbers will also be analytically mind--independent. By contrast, mental states such as sensations and beliefs will not be analytically mind--independent. Nor will artifacts such as hammers and soccer balls that owe their functions to the intentions of minded designers, and nor will Mentalese symbols (considered as tokens or types). Most Fregeans hold that senses are not analytically mind--independent either. As Burge writes of senses, "Their abstract identities are not independent of patterns of activity by thinkers in time" (2005, 58) . Our best analysis of what senses are appeals to thinkers and their activities. While it remains controversial how senses should be fully individuated, one constraint that is axiomatic among Fregeans is Frege's Criterion of Difference (Frege, 1892, 156; Evans, 1982, 18-19; Peacocke, 1992, 2) , which holds that two senses, S and T, are distinct if it is possible to rationally believe that . Peacocke (1992) individual senses are to be analyzed in terms of their "possession conditions", which state, for any given sense, the transitions in thought that a thinker must find "primitively compelling" in order to grasp the sense. For example, Peacocke holds that grasping the sense and is a matter of finding the following inferences primitively compelling (1992, 5). 5 P&Q P&Q P P Q Q P&Q Whatever the merits of Peacocke's account, it clearly denies that senses are analytically mind--independent since it analyzes senses in terms of the mental activity of thinkers, such as the inferences that thinkers find primitively compelling. 6 5 That is, one must find these inferences compelling, and not in virtue of inferring them from other premises. 6 To be sure, not everyone denies that Fregean senses are analytically mind--independent. There is a tradition, tracing at least to Kripke (1972) , and echoed recently by Stalnaker (2012, 759) , of interpreting senses as properties that are expressed by definite descriptions such as "the source that leaked secrets about Watergate to Woodward and Bernstein" or "the first visible body in the night sky". But neo--Fregeans are almost universally united in rejecting this interpretation (e.g. Dummett 1981, 110-51; Evans 1982, 18; Burge 1979) . As they point out, Frege never explicitly endorses it, says things about certain senses (e.g., of the first person) that are flatly incompatible with it, and defends a criterion for individuating senses (the Criterion of Difference) that would seem to count the senses of most singular and predicative concepts as distinct from definite descriptions. Moreover, whatever Frege himself thought, the theories of sense most neo--Fregeans
Since neither senses nor Mentalese symbol types are analytically mind--independent, we have once again failed to find an ontological difference between them.
Ontological Mind--Independence
Let us say that X is ontologically mind--independent just in case X does not depend for its existence on any minds, and thus could exist if there were no minds. 7 Some ontologically mind--independent entities are physical, such as rocks and trees. But there are also many abstract objects that are plausibly ontologically mind--independent, such as the number two. In fact, even abstract objects that are not analytically mind--independent might be counted as ontologically mind--independent.
For example, Platonists maintain that the property of painfulness is ontologically mind--independent because it exists independently of whether it is instantiated. Once again, we have no basis for distinguishing senses from Mentalese symbol types since both emerge as ontologically mind--independent, at least for Platonists. Senses are ontologically mind--independent since they are abstract objects that are supposed to exist independently of any particular thinker. True thoughts are discovered, not invented. Likewise, Platonists will maintain that Mentalese symbol types are ontologically mind--independent because they can exist without being instantiated-and as we have seen, Margolis and Laurence endorse Platonism in order to explain the fact that there are concepts that no one will possess.
Strong Ontological Mind--Independence
Let us say that X is a universal just in case X can have instances, and that X is a particular only if X is not a universal. We can then say that X is strongly ontologically mind--independent just in case (i) X is ontologically mind--independent and (ii) either X is a particular or some instances of X's are develop are patently not descriptive. Were Margolis and Laurence to appeal to a descriptive theory of sense to argue that senses are analytically mind--independent they would thus be guilty of attacking a straw man. 7 One feature of this formulation is that artifacts such as hammers and soccer balls turn out not to be ontologically mind--independent since their existence piggybacks on the intentions of minded designers. This outcome could be avoided by defining ontological mind--independence as a matter of an entity's not depending on any minds for its continued existence. A hammer may depend on a mind for its initial existence, but it could survive a nuclear holocaust that wiped out all thinkers. For our purposes, however, the choice between these two formulations is not important.
ontologically mind--independent. This category allows us to draw a distinction between two types of ontologically mind--independent abstract objects.
On the one hand, there are abstract universals such as painfulness whose instances are never ontologically mind--independent. Platonists maintain that if there were no minds, painfulness would still exist as a universal and is therefore ontologically mind--independent. But there is little question that without minds there wouldn't be any instances of pain, and thus that painfulness is not strongly ontologically mind--independent. Likewise, even if Mentalese symbol types do not depend on minds for their existence, Mentalese symbol tokens surely do. Thus, Mentalese symbol types are not strongly ontologically mind--independent either.
On the other hand, there are abstract objects that will count as strongly ontologically mind--independent. First, there are abstract universals such as triangularity, redness, and primeness, whose instances are (at least typically) ontologically mind--independent. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, there are abstract particulars-abstract objects that do not have instances. For example, many philosophers claim that individual numbers are abstract particulars.
If that's right, then the number two will count as strongly ontologically mind--independent since it will not be the sort of thing that can be instantiated. We have come, at last, to what I believe Margolis and Laurence see as the fundamental difference between senses and Mentalese symbol types. Because they take senses to be abstract particulars, Margolis and Laurence conclude that senses are unlike Mentalese symbol types in being strongly ontologically mind--independent. As a result, grasping a sense cannot be a matter of tokening a type or instantiating a property, leaving the grasping relation "utterly mysterious".
Defusing the Ontological Worry

The Ontological Worry Reformulated
We can now reconstruct Margolis and Laurence's ontological worry about senses.
(1) If senses are both causally mind--independent and strongly ontologically mind--independent, the grasping relation that thinkers are alleged to stand in towards senses is mysterious.
(2) Senses are causally mind--independent.
(3) Senses are strongly ontologically mind--independent.
Thus, (4) The grasping relation that thinkers are alleged to stand in towards senses is mysterious.
The argument is clearly valid, and I take premise (2) to be uncontroversial, so my focus will be on premises (1) and (3). I will argue that both premises are questionable.
Against Premise (1)
Premise (1) is predicated on the assumption that we only have two models for explaining how a mind could be related to a sense: a causal model and a tokening/instantiation model. If senses, as abstract objects, are causally mind--independent, the first model can't apply to them; and if senses, as abstract particulars, are strongly ontologically mind--independent, the second model can't apply to them. Thus, if senses are both causally and strongly ontologically mind--independent we are left no explanation of what grasping a sense could be. There is, however, a forceful objection to premise (1) that Margolis and Laurence do not consider. The objection comes into focus when we reconsider the analogy that they draw between senses and numbers. Numbers are often taken to be abstract particulars, and thus both causally and strongly ontologically mind--independent. According to this common conception, the number two is not located in space or time, is causally inert, and does not have any instances. But notice how absurd it would be to conclude that physical objects couldn't stand in a relation to numbers-for example, that the coins in my pocket couldn't possibly total five, that today's air temperature couldn't be 28 degrees Centigrade, or that the length of my nightstand couldn't be two--thirds of a meter. Of course, the relation here isn't causal. The coins in my pocket are not causally related to the number five. Nor is the relation plausibly akin to that between a universal and its instances. The number 28 is not tokened or otherwise instantiated in the air, nor is the fraction two--thirds instantiated in my nightstand. 8 So there has to be some way of being related to abstract particulars that is not a matter of causation or instantiation. The question thus arises: could thinkers not be related to senses in the same way that objects and magnitudes are related to numbers? The answer will surely depend on how we understand the relation between objects or magnitudes and numbers. This is a vexed issue, but one plausible account appeals to the idea of a structural mapping, such as an isomorphism. Both numbers and magnitudes are structured, and sometimes it works out that there is an orderly mapping between their structures. As a result, we can index objects and magnitudes to numbers once we settle on a criterion of individuation for the objects, or a scale of measurement for the magnitudes. For example, we can map the coins in my pocket to the number five because we have settled on a particular way of individuating those coins (roughly: by a criterion of spatiotemporal separability), and a mapping to the natural numbers that respects the successor relation. Similarly, we can map physical lengths to real numbers once we settle on a scale of measurement (e.g. metric units) because physical lengths correspond in an orderly way to real numbers once such a scale is imposed. It is likewise open to the proponent of senses to maintain that the minds of thinkers have an internal structure that just so happens to map in an orderly way onto the structure of senses. On this view, grasping a sense is a matter of having a mind that is indexed to that sense according to the best available mapping. This indexing view of grasping a sense raises many questions. What is the analog of the criterion of individuation or scale of measurement for minds? What makes one mapping better than 8 When we consider cardinalities there is, perhaps, a greater temptation to view natural numbers as universals, and thus to say that the coins in my pocket instantiate the number five. I think, however, that this view is optional, and that there is a coherent alternative view that distinguishes cardinalities from their associated natural numbers. According to this alternative view, while the coins in my pocket might instantiate a particular cardinality, they do not instantiate the natural number that we associate with that cardinality. In any case, nothing turns on this issue. Even if natural numbers can sometimes be instantiated, the fact that numbers can also be used in ways where they are not instantiated, as when they are used to measure temperatures and lengths, is sufficient to suggest the alternative model of how abstract objects can be related to worldly entities that I am about to discuss.
others? Might there be considerable indeterminacy in how senses are indexed to thinkers? My present point, however, is not that the indexing view can definitely be developed into a compelling account of grasping a sense, but that Margolis and Laurence ignore it altogether. If senses are supposed to be like numbers, and numbers can be helpfully indexed to objects and magnitudes, the question at least deserves asking whether thinkers can be helpfully indexed to senses. Only if we were confident that the answer is "no" would we have reason to accept premise (1).
Against Premise (3)
The obvious alternative to identifying senses with abstract particulars is identifying them with abstract universals that are instantiated by thinkers. In that case, senses would be like painfulness and Mentalese symbol types, and so there would be no special obstacle to explaining the grasping relation. To grasp a sense would just be to instantiate a universal-a mental property or type. The challenge is to explain what sort of property or type senses could be. There are surely many possibilities. Here I will focus on just two of them.
One possibility is to equate senses with dispositions, and the grasping of a sense with the instantiation of a disposition. This view has echoes in Peacocke's (1992) account of possession conditions: to find a mental transition "primitively compelling" is, roughly, to be disposed to undertake it in a primitive way. The sense and, for example, might be analyzed as the dispositionshared by all persons who can think conjunctive thoughts-to draw the inferences associated with the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction. Thinkers then count as grasping the sense if and only if they have, or instantiate, this disposition. (Note: the instantiation of a disposition is to be distinguished from the manifestation of a disposition. A glass can instantiate the disposition of fragility at a time, t, even if it isn't breaking at t. Likewise, if senses are dispositions then a thinker can grasp a sense at t even if she isn't manifesting that sense at t.)
A second possibility takes senses to be capacities or abilities, and the grasping of a sense to be the instantiation of a capacity or ability. 9 (Again, the instantiation of an ability is to be distinguished from the exercise of an ability. At the present moment you have, or instantiate, many abilities that you are not currently exercising.) This idea sits naturally with the theory of sense developed by Evans (1982) , who explicitly maintains that episodes of thinking are structured from the exercise of distinct abilities.
Thus, someone who thinks that John is happy and that Harry is happy exercises on two occasions the conceptual ability which we call 'possessing the concept of happiness'. And similarly someone who thinks that John is happy and that John is sad exercises on two occasions a single ability, the ability to think of, or think about, John. (Evans 1982, 101) For Evans, "possessing the concept of happiness" and "grasping the sense happiness" are equivalent bits of jargon, both of which are to be cashed out in terms of having a particular ability. Notice that these two accounts of senses do not claim to be reductive. In identifying a sense with a disposition or ability, one need not insist that those dispositions or abilities can be explicated in non--semantic or non--mental terms. Indeed, most Fregeans deny that senses can be so explicated.
But that's to be expected. Most dispositions and abilities can only be explicated by way of a small circle of closely related terms. For example, the property of being a comedian is, plausibly, best analyzed in terms of a disposition or ability, though the chances of reductively explicating that disposition or ability without the help of comedic terms such as "funny" or "laughter" seem slim.
To be clear, while neo--Fregeans often identify the grasping of a sense with the possession or instantiation of a certain type of disposition or ability, and the thinking of a thought with the manifestation or exercise of certain dispositions or abilities, I am not aware of anyone who unequivocally identifies senses themselves with dispositions, abilities, or any other universal. 10 But I am now suggesting that we could take this extra step, which would then provide us with a simple explanation of how thinkers can be related to senses. If grasping a sense were just instantiating a universal, there would be no more of an ontological worry about how thinkers are related to senses than of how thinkers are related to Mentalese symbol types. Notice, moreover, that we would also have a straightforward explanation of why senses can solve Frege's puzzle. Because everyone who instantiates a given sense shares a way of being related to a referent-a way that is embodied in the disposition or ability that constitutes the sense-there is no issue of there being radically different ways to grasp a sense. This last point deserves greater emphasis. Margolis and Laurence are led to worry about how senses can solve Frege's puzzle because of the misleading analogy they draw between grasping a sense and thinking about a number. As they point out, there are different ways to think about the number two. I can think of it as the successor of one, as the only even prime, or as my favorite number. All of these different ways of thinking about the number two have nothing in common except the number two. Thus, if grasping a sense were like thinking about a number, the various ways of grasping a sense would have nothing more in common than their referent, in which case senses could not be used to solve Frege's puzzle. But if senses are universals, the analogy is wrongheaded. Just as thinking about the color red is to be distinguished from instantiating that color, thinking about a sense is to be distinguished from grasping a sense. My handkerchief instantiates the color red, but it cannot think about that color. Similarly, if grasping a sense is a matter of having the disposition or ability to draw the inferences associated with the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction, my five--year--old cousin grasps the sense and. He can and does draw those inferences. But he clearly lacks the higher--order disposition or ability to think 10 Perhaps Burge (2005, 29-30) comes the closest. Replying to the worry that the grasping relation is mysterious, he comments that the "role" of senses is to "type--identify explanatory kinds", including psychological capacities, states, and events, and thus that the grasping relation is no more problematic than the relation between a biological kind and its instances.
about the sense and-i.e., he lacks the disposition or ability to think about the disposition or ability to draw the inferences associated with the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction. Once this distinction between grasping a sense and thinking about a sense is kept firmly in mind, there is no obstacle to using senses to distinguish co--referential concepts.
Treating senses as abstract universals clearly undermines premise (3), and seems to be compatible with the thrust of the interpretations of sense given by Peacocke, Evans, and other
Fregeans. So why do Margolis and Laurence assume that senses must be abstract particulars? I am not entirely certain, but it is notable that at one point they write that the difference between
Mentalese symbols and senses is that senses "don't admit of a type--token distinction" (2007, 589, n. 7; see also Sutton 2004 grasp a sense is just that they token a certain ability type. Second, while all types are plausibly universals (they have tokens as their instances), the converse is doubtful. There are plausibly some universals that are not types. Paradigmatic properties such as redness are often conceived as having instances, and thus as being universals, but are unlike types at least in that they are more readily expressed by predicates than by singular terms. 11 Thus, even if Margolis and Laurence were right that senses weren't types, it wouldn't follow that they weren't universals.
Admittedly, Frege never writes of senses being instantiated, and his appeal to "grasping a sense" (e.g., 1892, 153; 1897, 237; 1918, 328) does not seem on its face to invoke the instantiation 11 Drawing on Wollheim (1968 ), Wetzel (2009 points to other differences between paradigmatic properties and types: types (e.g., the letter "A", the grizzly bear, Old Glory) are all objects, but paradigmatic properties (e.g., redness, triangularity, happiness) are not; types share more qualities with their tokens than properties share with their instances (e.g., the grizzly bear and its tokens are both brown, furry, ferocious, etc., but the property of redness shares little with its instances); and properties never exemplify their defining qualities (e.g., redness isn't red) but types do (e.g., Old Glory is rectangular). 
What Senses Must Be
In the course of evaluating Margolis and Laurence's argument, we encountered two conceptions of senses and, correspondingly, two conceptions of grasping a sense. According to the first, senses are abstract particulars like numbers, and grasping a sense is a matter of being indexed to a sense in a maximally perspicuous structural mapping. According to the second, senses are universals such as abilities or dispositions, and grasping a sense is a matter of instantiating a universal. So far, I have remained neutral between these two conceptions. I believe, however, that the second view is preferable to the first.
The problem with taking senses to be abstract particulars like numbers is that it makes a mystery of their analytic mind--dependence. If senses were like numbers, we would have no explanation of why they are always analyzed in terms of the minds of thinkers. On most plausible accounts, numbers aren't analyzed in terms of physical objects such as coins or magnitudes such as temperatures. Nor are they plausibly analyzed in terms mental attributes. While some think that our best analysis of numbers appeals to Hume's principle, and others think that numbers simply are certain sets, almost no one holds that numbers are best analyzed by reference to physical objects or minds. By contrast, contemporary Fregeans almost always analyze senses in terms of the mental.
The problem I am raising is not that it is unprecedented for an entity to be both analytically mind--dependent and strongly ontologically mind--independent. Consider the view that identifies red with whatever physical property gives rise to such--and--such experiences in normal human perceivers in normal conditions. Suppose that, as it turns out, the physical property meeting this definition is a certain gerrymandered set of spectral reflectances that we can call P. Clearly P does not depend for its existence on any minds. A ripe tomato has its particular spectral reflectance independently of whether anyone is ever around to notice it. Thus, red will be ontologically mind--independent on this view of color. But if we accept that the best analysis of red nevertheless appeals to the experiences of normal perceivers-and the gerrymandered nature of P suggests that it doeswe will have to accept that P is analytically mind--dependent.
This example shows that there is nothing incoherent about something's being analytically mind--dependent and strongly ontologically mind--independent. There is, however, a big difference between senses and colors. On the view of colors in question, we have two ways of individuating them: as whatever causes certain experiences in us; and as spectral reflectance properties of physical objects. The naturalness of the first mode of individuation might make it primary, but the second mode of individuation is there all the same. By contrast, senses do not have this dual existence. Our only way of individuating them is in terms of the minds of thinkers. It is thus much harder to see how their analytic mind--dependence can be squared with their strong ontological mind--independence.
To put the point another way, there are two ways for an abstract object to be strongly ontologically mind--independent: by having no instances (being an abstract particular) or by having non--mental instances. Colors are strongly ontologically mind--independent because they meet the latter condition; they have non--mental, purely physical instances. As a result, there is a way of individuating colors that appeals to the purely physical. But on a view that treats senses as strongly ontologically mind--independent they have no instances. As a result, they cannot be individuated according to some purely physical criterion in the way that colors can. In itself, this does not rule out the possibility that senses could be individuated, like numbers, in some way that is neither mental nor physical. But in point of fact, mental activity appears to be the only route we have to their individuation.
To be sure, there is no contradiction in the supposition that senses are both analytically mind--dependent and abstract particulars. One could hold that senses have a real objective existence as abstract particulars, but that we just don't know enough about them in order to explicate their natures except by relation to our own minds. But at the same time, nor can I think of any reason to take this possibility seriously.
Like Margolis and Laurence, I have been criticizing senses conceived as abstract particulars.
There is, however, a significant difference between Margolis and Laurence's criticism and mine.
Margolis and Laurence worry how senses can be grasped if they are abstract particulars. I argued,
however, that the availability of an indexing view undermines this worry. The problem with supposing that senses are abstract particulars is rather that it fails to explain why our full understanding of senses comes from the mental activity of thinkers. In other words, the problem is not how senses as abstract particulars can be grasped, but why the entirety of our knowledge of them derives from their being grasped.
If I'm right, Fregeans should not look to numbers for their model of mental contents, but to abilities, dispositions, or other universals. From an ontological perspective, senses and Mentalese symbols will thus be related to thinkers in much the same way, as a universal to its instance. The choice between them will, therefore, not turn on matters of ontology, but on more earthly considerations, such as empirical evidence for the reality of a purely formal level of psychological explanation. That is surely as it should be. 12
